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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001369

SIPDIS

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DEPARTMENT FOR AF/SPG AND S/CRS
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

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TAGS: [PGOV](#) [KPKO](#) [AU](#) [UN](#) [SU](#)

SUBJECT: SLM/MINAWI COMMANDER VENTS ON AMIS AND DISCOUNTS
FACTION'S ALLEGED MISDEEDS

Classified By: DCM Roberto Powers, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)

SUMMARY

¶1. (SBU) S/CRS Field Officers met with Sudan Liberation Army (SLA)-Minawi General Commander Jumah Hagar and three of his staff to discuss security in areas of Darfur under his control, alleged SLA-Minawi involvement in carjackings, strained relations between the rebel group and AMIS, and prospects for improved security with a new peace process. Hagar offered that security throughout Darfur remained "fragile" and that the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) was doing little to improve conditions; he discounted accusations that SLA-Minawi soldiers were largely responsible for mounting carjackings and other criminal activity in the region. End summary.

"FRAGILE" SECURITY, PARTICULARLY SOUTH DARFUR

¶2. (SBU) In El Fasher to attend Minni Minawi's SLA Revolutionary Council conference, General Commander of Military Forces Jumah Hagar offered his views on security in Darfur. He held that stability prevailed in "liberated areas" (i.e., areas under SLA-Minawi or other rebel factions' control), but that significant tensions remain in South Darfur near Ed Daein, Adila and Muhajeria. (Note: Numerous clashes have taken place throughout August between Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and rebels in and around Adila as well as between SLA-Minawi fighters and Arab Ma'alia tribesman. End Note.) Hagar alleged that the Sudanese Government continues to fan the flames of conflict in Darfur by providing weapons, uniforms, and logistical support to select Arab tribes. He alleged that Ma'alia vehicles were being repaired at SAF workshops in South Darfur. Sudanese officials and some international observers claim that much of the violence and anarchy in Darfur is caused by rebel movements.

¶3. (C) Hagar observed that, in part, the "fragile" security situation in Darfur was due to rampant violations of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) ceasefire and unwillingness on the part of the Government to implement the security provisions set out under the peace accord. He affirmed SLA-Minawi's rejection of the appointment of General Mohammed Addabi as Chairman of the Security Arrangements Implementation Committee (SAC) under the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority (TDRA). Hagar noted that he met with Addabi only a few days earlier and was disappointed that the SAC Chairman refused to establish several key security

sub-committees, including on weapons control, and would only provide sufficient non-military logistical support for 4000 soldiers, the number of former combatants entitled to be integrated into the SAF, according to the DPA. Hagar's assistants unanimously observed that the Government was not "serious" in implementation of the DPA and that unless greater international pressure were brought to bear on Khartoum, it would not fulfill its security obligations (e.g., disarmament of Janjaweed) resulting from any new political negotiations. (Note: SLM representatives have repeatedly sought USG assistance in identifying an effective foreign general to head the Security Advisory Team (SAT) stipulated in the DPA as a counter-weight to Addabi's influence on the implementation of security arrangements. Embassy Khartoum has approached Norway with this request but has not received a response from Oslo. End note.)

AMBIGUOUS PLEDGES TO COOPERATE WITH AMIS

14. (SBU) Responding to Field Officers' queries about the relationship between SLA-Minawi and AMIS, Hagar and his staff-- including Khalid Adam Abbaker (Office Manager and Senior SLA-Minawi rep on the SAC) and Abdel Majid Wadi Ibrahim (Hagar's advisor)--argued that AMIS was "no longer neutral" and had become a tool of the Sudanese Government. The SLA-Minawi representatives cited several examples to buttress their case, noting repeated instances when AMIS either failed or refused to investigate alleged ceasefire violations committed by the Government against SLA-Minawi. Hagar expressed frustration that his faction continued to be blamed--in his mind, unjustifiably--for ongoing carjackings and other criminal activity. Echoing Minawi's comments to Field Officers several days earlier, Hagar acknowledged that

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some "renegade" soldiers might be engaged in illicit acts but that the faction was also cooperating with AMIS, the UN, and NGOs to combat banditry and return stolen vehicles to their owners.

15. (SBU) Regarding the May 30 vehicle accident and subsequent confrontation that occurred between AMIS troops and SLA-Minawi in Labado, resulting in the deaths of two Minawi soldiers and the theft by SLA-Minawi of thirteen AMIS vehicles, Hagar stated that he was prepared to initially return five vehicles to AMIS as a "goodwill gesture" and would return the remainder once compensation was paid to the families of the victims. He remarked that he had made this offer to AMIS Deputy Head of Mission Hassan Gibril but had not received a follow-up response. S/CRS Field Officers informed Hagar that on August 20, the Ceasefire Commission (CFC) adopted its investigation report on the Labado incident, which included recommendations that AMIS pay monetary compensation for the accident victims. Field Officers also raised concerns about the continued absence of SLA-Minawi reps in the sectors, despite official announcements from Minawi himself that his personnel would resume patrol and investigation activities with AMIS. Hagar affirmed that his soldiers "should" return to work but maintained that transportation problems were preventing many from reporting to their posts.

COMMENT

16. (SBU) Hagar's discourse underlines significant internal gaps, at a variety of levels, between SLA-Minawi's political and military leadership. Hagar and his staff appeared unaware that the final CFC report on Labado had been adopted and included favorable--from the SLA-Minawi perspective--recommendations to pay compensation. Moreover, Hagar contradicted Minawi's pledges to AMIS and S/CRS Field Officers that the faction would promptly return the

confiscated vehicles, further muddying the waters of who truly wields authority over the SLA. Minawi's orders that his representatives resume work with AMIS also appear to have either been poorly communicated or blatantly ignored. More than two weeks after Minawi issued the directive, the majority of his soldiers have yet to return to their assigned sectors. In several instances, AMIS reports that the representatives refuse to resume their duties until they receive direct orders from Hagar. End comment.

FERNANDEZ